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Standing to Contest Administrative Action
Under the Land Withdrawal and Review Program:

Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation/ the Supreme Court
determined, in a five-to-four decision, that a private organization lacked
standing to contest a proposed withdrawal of land. This note contends
that the Supreme Court's decision to affirm the district court's grant of
summary judgment, a common Supreme Court practice, 2 was not an
efficient use of judicial resources. 3 Despite evidence supporting standing, the Court opted to decide the matter primarily on a procedural
basis and thereby precluded a substantive analysis of the law in this
sensitive area.
Part II of this note briefly summarizes the statutes and federal
court decisions that provide the background for Lujan. Part III introduces the facts of Lujan. Part IV sets forth the Court's reasoning on
the summary judgment issue. Part V analyzes the Lujan decision,
I. 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990). It is helpful at this point to indicate that Lujan v. National
Wildlife Federation, the case before the Supreme Court, is cited as National Wildlife Federation
v. Burford in the lower federal courts. In this note, therefore, references to Lujan and Burford
are to this same case at different stages of litigation.
2. The notion of judicial restraint is often invoked by the Court to summarily dismiss cases;
the Court occasionally relies upon notions of prudence and avoids "political questions" to abstain
from deciding cases on their merits. See, e.g., Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles,
331 U.S. 549 (1947); Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
3. The district court's summary disposition was somewhat surprising since the case had been
through protracted litigation in the lower federal courts. In National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford,
676 F. Supp. 271 (D.D.C. 1985), the district court originally granted the respondents a preliminary injunction and found they had standing to contest the withdrawal of the federal land. The
D.C. Circuit subsequently affirmed the district court decision and remanded the case to the district
court in National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 835 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1987). On remand, the
district court dissolved the preliminary injunction and granted petitioner's motion for summary
judgment, finding that respondents lacked standing to contest the withdrawal order. National
Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 699 F. Supp. 327 (D.D.C. 1988). The D.C. Circuit, however, reversed
the district court and held that respondents did have adequate standing in the controversy. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 878 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Subsequent to this decision of
the D.C. Circuit, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Lujan, 110 S.
Ct. 834 (1990). The Supreme Court then reversed the decision of the D.C. Circuit finding that the
National Wildlife Federation lacked standing. Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3177
(1990). Subsequently the Court vacated its decision in Lujan, stating "[t]he judgment is vacated
and the case is remanded to the [D.C. Circuit] . . . for further consideration in light of Lujan v.
National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990)." Mountain States Legal Found. v. National
Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3265 (1990).
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stressing that the Lujan court missed an opportunity to solidify principles in this area of the law, and proffers a possible solution for actions
similar to Lujan in the future. This note concludes that Lujan provided an occasion to review the program of public land withdrawal and
that the Court should not have limited itself solely to the standing issue
in deciding the case.

II.

BACKGROUND

The Administrative Procedure Act of 1966 (APA) 4 allows the
Court to review federal agency actions. The APA requires that a party
establish standing in order to invoke judicial review. 5 A party establishes standing by demonstrating that first, they have been affected by
some "agency action," and second, they have been "adversely affected
or aggrieved" by the agency action. 6
A number of cases illustrate how standing is obtained on an individual or organizational basis. 7 The Court in Hunt v. Washington
State Apple Advertising Commission, 8 recognized that an organization
can establish "representational standing" 9 when "( 1) . . . its members
would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (2) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and
(3) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit." 10 In Sierra Club v.
Morton/ 1 a case preceding Hunt, the Court provided additional guidance for obtaining representational standing when it stated that "the
'injury in fact' test requires more than an injury to a cognizable interest. It requires that the party seeking review be himself among the

injured." 12
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in National
Wildlife Federation v. Burford 13 further described the type of injury
4. Ch. 423, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706
(1988)).
5. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988).
6. /d.

7. See, e.g., International Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of Am. v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274 (1986); Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n,
432 U.S. 333 (1977); United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
(SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
8. 432 u.s. 333 (1977).
9. Representational standing is the ability granted an organization to represent either itself or
its members in a judicial proceeding. See id. at 342-43.
10. /d. at 343.
11. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
12. /d. at 734-35 (emphasis added).
13. 835 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1987), modified, 699 F. Supp. 327 (D.D.C. 1988), rev'd, 878
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necessary to provide standing and invoke judicial review. The court
stated that "(the party asserting standing] must allege facts demonstrating a definable and discernible injury to its members and an adequate
connection between that injury and the members." 1 ' In environmental
lawsuits, the injury requirement is particularly relevant since there exists the potential for involving numerous individuals and vast areas of
land. 111 The Court provided guidance in examining the injury requirement in Sierra/ 6 as intimated earlier/ 7 and in United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP). 18
In Sierra, an environmental organization contested a government
decision to permit the development of a "quasi-wilderness" national
park by private developers. 19 The Sierra Club alleged that the private
development of public lands would be injurious to the interests it was
designed to protect, namely "the conservation and the sound maintenance of the national parks, game refuges and forests of the country
20
•..."
The Sierra Club stated that the development "would destroy
or otherwise adversely affect the scenery, natural and historic objects
and wildlife of the park and would impair the enjoyment of the park
for future generations." 21 Although the Court recognized the alleged
injury as a "cognizable injury," the Supreme Court denied standing
and declared that "(t]he Sierra Club failed to allege that it or its members would be affected in any of their activities or pastimes by the . . .
development." 22 From Sierra, therefore, it appears that a party must
allege injury to all or specific members of an organization to ensure
standing. 23 A mere allegation of a public injury, therefore, is not sufficient to establish standing. 2 '
The Sierra limitation for group standing proved to be minor, 211
since the Court in SCRAP recognized group standing to contest an
agency decision. 26 In SCRAP, a student organization sought to contest a
F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1989), rev'd sub nom. Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3177
(1990), vacated sub nom. Mountain States Legal Found. v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct.
3265 ( 1990).
14. /d. at 311 (citation omitted).
15. See id. at 311-15.
16. Sierra v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
17. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
18. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
19. Sierra, 405 U.S. at 728-30.
20. /d. at 730.
21. /d. at 734.
22. /d. at 735.
23. See id. at 734-35.
24. /d.
25. G. GUNTHER, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw 1549 n.4 (lith ed. 1985).
26. See United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412
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federal agency rate increase. The plaintiffs alleged injury in fact resulting from the agency decision. 27 The group also alleged that the rate
increase would impair their use of the "air" and "the forests, rivers,
streams, mountains and other natural resources" in the Washington
area. 28 The plaintiffs, undoubtedly in response to the Court's Sierra
decision, alleged that they actually used "the forest, rivers, streams,
mountains and other resources surrounding the Washington Metropolitan area." 29 The plaintiffs also claimed that the agency decision would
disrupt their recreational and aesthetic enjoyment of the region. 30
The D.C. Circuit in Burford relied upon the SCRAP analysis to
affirm the district court's decision. 31 The D.C. Circuit concluded that
the National Wildlife Federation (NWF) had satisfied the standing requirement as prescribed by SCRAP and other cases. 32 Although the
Court in Lujan ultimately determined that the NWF did not have adequate standing to contest the agency action, the cases just cited support
the NWF's position that the organization or its members were affected
by an "agency action" and that their allegations were sufficient to overcome a motion for summary judgment in the matter. 33 Because the
NWF demonstrated the requisite injury, it appears that the D.C. Circuit in Burford properly granted standing and review under the APA.

III.

FACTS

In Lujan, the NWF argued that the D.C. Circuit's decision
(which reversed the district court's decision granting summary judgment and found that the NWF did in fact have standing to contest the
agency action) should be affirmed. 34 The primary concern before both
the appellate and district courts was the standing of a private organizaU.S. 669 (1973).
27. /d. at 678.
28. /d. (quoting SCRAP's amended complaint).
29. !d.
30. /d.
31. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 835 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1987), modified, 699 F.
Supp. 327 (D.D.C. 1988), 1·ev'd, 878 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1989), rev'd sub nom. Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990), vacated sub nom. Mountain States Found. v.
National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3265 (1990). See supra notes 1, 3.
32. Burford, 835 F.2d at 311-17. The D.C. Circuit stated the synthesized rule to be: "[I]n
order to establish injury in fact for representational standing, an organization must allege facts
showing that one or more of its members is among the persons injured by the challenged agency
action." /d. at 311.
33. See supra notes 18-29 and accompanying text; see also Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S.
727 (1972); United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412
U.S. 669 (1973).
34. For an explanation of the procedural posture of the case, see supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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tion to contest a federal agency action. The NWF alleged that the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) had violated public and private interests811 as established by the Federal ~and Policy and Management
Act of 197 6 (FLPMA) 36 and by the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969 (NEPA). 37 Accordingly, the NWF sought judicial review
and an injunction against the BLM's "land withdrawal and review
program." 38
The federal district court initially held that the NWF had standing in the matter and granted its motion for a preliminary injunction. 88
The D.C. Circuit affirmed, 40 stating that "we conclude that the federation has alleged facts that demonstrate that the actions of the Department threaten to harm the cognizable interests of the Federation's
members. Consequently, we find that the Federation has alleged injury
in fact sufficient to establish standing to pursue its . . . claims against
the Department." 41 The D.C. Circuit also agreed with the district
court's conclusion that a preliminary injunction should issue.' 2 Finally,
the D.C. Circuit issued a further order both reiterating the sensitive
nature of the action and mandating that the district court hold a plenary hearing on the matter. 43
35. See infra notes 53-58 and accompanying text. The public violations involved were alleged
to be actions taken under the "land withdrawal and review program" which were in violation of
the expressly stated purposes of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA) and the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) (e.g., to "provide for outdoor recreation and human
occupancy and use [of public lands]." 43 U.S.C. § 1701 (a)(8) (1988)). The private violations, as
supported by National Wildlife Federation (NWF) member affidavits, revolved around allegations
of interference with the recreational use and aesthetic enjoyment of the public lands by private
citizens. See Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990).
36. Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2743 (1973) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 1701
(1988)).
37. Pub. L. No. 91-190, § 102, 83 Stat. 852, 853-54 (1970) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 4321 (1988)).
38. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 676 F. Supp. 271, 273 (D.D.C. 1985), modified,
676 F. Supp. 280 (D.D.C. 1986), affd, 835 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1987), modified, 699 F. Supp.
327 (D.D.C. 1988), rev'd, 878 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1989), rev'd sub nom. Lujan v. National
Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990), vacated sub nom. Mountain States Found. v. National
Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3265 (1990). The BLM's land withdrawal review program permits the
BLM to remove land from the reserve of public lands and allows private parties to occupy and use
the land for such activities as mining, forestation, and other private ventures.
39. See id. at 273.
40. Burford, 835 F.2d at 327.
41. !d. at 314.
42. /d. at 319. In determining that the preliminary injunction should issue, both the D.C.
Circuit and the district court analyzed the following four factors: "(I) the plaintiffs likelihood of
success on the merits; (2) the threat of irreparable injury to the plaintiff absent the injunction; (3)
the possibility of substantial harm to other parties caused by issuance of the injunction; and (4) the
public interest." /d. at 318-19.
43. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 844 F.2d 889 (D.C. Cir. 1988). The court stated
that "this is a serious case with serious implications." !d. at 889 (quoting Burford, 835 F.2d at
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At the plenary hearing, the district court granted the defendant's
motion for summary judgment, concluding that the plaintiffs did not
have proper "standing" to contest the agency action. 44 This decision
prevented a complete review of the alleged violations resulting from the
withdrawal of public lands. What followed in the D.C. Circuit and the
Supreme Court was simply a review of the basis for summary judgment, the discretionary actions taken by the district court, and the indefinite standing requirements. The substantive question of whether
there was agency action in violation of prescribed federal policy was
limited by summarily deciding the case.
IV.

REASONING

In Lujan, the Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit's decision
and concluded that the district court correctly granted summary judgment in National Wildlife Federation v. Burford." 6 The Court held
that the NWF did not establish standing for the action, determining
that it proved neither the requisite injury nor that its member(s) had
been "adversely effected." 46 The Court also concluded that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to consider additional affidavits submitted by the NWF. 47
The Court's rationale for affirming the district court's decision
rested upon its application of Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil
327). In the final paragraph of the decision, the D.C. Circuit stated:
While this case continues to pend in our court, the district court has not gone forward
with plenary consideration of the merits. The court here denies the petitions for rehearing and issues its mandate forthwith with directions to the parties and the district court
to proceed with this litigation with dispatch.
Burford, 844 F.2d at 890.
44. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 699 F. Supp. 327 (D.D.C. 1988), rev'd, 878 F.2d
422 (D.C. Cir. 1989), rev'd sub nom. Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990),
vacated sub nom. Mountain States Found. v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3265 (1990).
45. See Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990). The relevant district court
decision granting the motion for summary judgment against the NWF was National Wildlife
Fed'n v. Burford, 699 F. Supp. 327 (D.D.C. 1988).
46. See Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3185-86.
47. See id. at 3191-93. The arridavits riled with the district court originally consisted of the
"Peterson" and "Erman" affidavits. These affidavits, submitted by two members of the NWF,
went to the standing requirement that either the organization or its members suffered an injury in
fact as required by the Sierra and SCRAP decisions. See supra notes 19-30 and accompanying
text. The district court ultimately determined that the NWF had failed to satisfy the standing
requirement, finding that the "Peterson" and "Erman" affidavits were "vague, conclusory and
lack[ed] factual specificity." Burford, 699 F. Supp. at 332. The NWF, to satisfy the standing
requirement, attempted to submit four additional member affidavits alleging more specific injury
due to the federal agency action. See Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3189-93. The Court determined that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to consider the additional affidavits, finding
them to be untimely under Rule 6(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. /d. at 3191-93.
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Procedure. 48 In applying the rule, the Court notably relied upon the
now seminal case Celotex Corp. v. Catrett. 49 In Lujan, the Court
quoted Celotex which pronounced:
[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary
judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against
a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that
party will bear the burden of proof at trial.G 0

The party seeking review under section 702 of the APA bears the burden to "set forth specific facts . . . showing that he has satisfied its
terms." 111 Essentially, the Court concluded that the two members' affidavits did not give rise to a genuine factual dispute. 112
The NWF, to satisfy the injury requirement of the APA and as
compelled under the Sierra and SCRAP decisions, submitted affidavits
from two of its members, 113 Peggy Peterson and Richard Erman. 114
These affidavits alleged interference with Peterson's and Erman's recreational use and aesthetic enjoyment of certain public lands which
were withdrawn under the BLM's land withdrawal review program. 1111
48. This procedural rule states that a party is entitled to summary judgment in his favor "if
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. C1v. P. 56( c) (emphasis added).
49. 477 U.S. 317 (1986). This case dealt with a wrongful death action wherein the respondent alleged that her husband's death was the result of exposure to asbestos products manufactured or delivered by the fifteen defendant corporations named in the action. ld. at 319. The
district court granted summary judgment to the petitioners since the respondents were unable to
produce evidence to support the wrongful death allegation before the court. ld. The evidence
produced by the respondent in opposition to the motion for summary judgment consisted of three
documents. ld. at 320. The three documents were challenged by the petitioners as hearsay and
were not admitted at trial. ld. Petitioners concluded that since the evidence submitted by the
respondents was inadmissible, the court should not be precluded from entering summary judgment. ld. The Supreme Court in deciding the case solidified its procedure of sustaining a motion
for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and clarified the
ambiguity resulting from the decision in Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970), which
states:
Under Rule 56(c), summary judgment is proper 'if the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law . . . .'
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)).
50. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3186 (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,322 (1986))
(emphasis added).
51. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3187 (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740 (1972)).
52. See Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3187-89.
53. See Burford, 699 F. Supp. at 331.
54. ld.; see also supra note 47.
55. These were the original affidavits that the NWF submitted alleging interference of the
two respective NWF members' use of public lands. See supra note 47.
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Based upon this alleged interference, the NWF sought to contest the
BLM's land withdrawal review program as it related to FLPMA and
NEPA. 116 The NWF tried to obtain judicial review of the federal program pursuant to the APA. 117 The Court determined, however, that the
NWF failed to show that the land withdrawal review program was a
final agency action and that its members had been "adversely affected
or aggrieved." 118
The Court emphasized that under the APA, there exists no right
to a private cause of action. 119 A party is required, therefore, to provide
evidence of an agency action which is final in nature and which demonstrates the party has "suffered a legal wrong" in order to obtain judicial review. 60 The Court failed to find a final agency action in Lujan,
since the land withdrawal and review program did not constitute a single administrative act but referred to a general scheme. 61 Additionally,
the Court concluded that the general statements contained in the Peterson and Erman affidavits did not constitute a sufficient aggrievement to
justify judicial review. 62 The Court concluded its determination on
standing by citing Sierra, which states that "[t]he burden is on the
party seeking review under section 702 to set forth specific facts (even
though they may be controverted by the Government) showing that he
has satisfied its terms." 63
The NWF attempted to present four additional affidavits in order
to overcome the alleged evidentiary insufficiencies. 64 The district court,
however, refused to consider the supplemental affidavits. 611 The NWF
56. The relevant interference is found within the statutes. For example, the purpose of the
FLPMA is to insure that
the public lands be managed in a manner that will protect the quality of scientific,
scenic, historical, ecological, environmental, air and atmospheric, water resource, and
archeological values; that, where appropriate, will preserve and protect certain public
lands in their natural condition; . . . and that will provide for outdoor recreation
and human occupancy and use . . . .
43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(8) (1988) (emphasis added).
57. 5 u.s.c. § 706 (1988).
58. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3185-86.
59. Id. at 3185.
60. Id. at 3185-86.
61. See id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1988)). Section 704 reads: "Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there is not other adequate remedy in a court are
subject to judicial review." Id. (emphasis added).
62. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3187-89. This conclusion was reached primarily due to the vast
amount of land included in the withdrawal area and the failure on the part of the affidavits to
identify a specific area harmed. See id. at 3188.
63. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3186-87 (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740
(1972)).
64. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3189.
65. ld. at 3191-92.
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contended that the district court erred in refusing to consider this additional evidence. These additional affidavits, however, were not submitted within the prescribed time limit. Admission of tardy evidence is
governed by Rule 6(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which
provides:
When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of
court an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified
time, the court for cause shown may at .any time in its discretion (1)
with or without motion or notice order the period enlarged if request
therefore is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as extended by a previous order, or (2) upon motion made
after the expiration of the specified period permit the act to be done
where the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect . . . .66

The Court recognized that under Rule 6(b) the acceptance of additional evidence fell completely within the discretion of the district
court. 67 But as a preliminary matter to invoking Rule 6(b), NWF had
to meet the requirements of the rule, which it had not done. 68 Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court acted within
its discretion when it precluded the admission of the four subsequent
affidavits. 89 The affirmation in this manner of the district court decision on a purely procedural basis allowed the Court to avoid discussing
the politically sensitive issue of public land withdrawai.1°
V.

ANALYSIS

A. The Requisite Elements That Constitute "Standing" to Contest
an Administrative Agency Ruling
The pertinent statute for relief from a federal administrative action is the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 71 To establish standing, the APA requires that an aggrieved party show that it has been
affected by some "agency action." 72 In addition, the party must prove
that it has been "adversely affected or aggrieved" by the administrative
66. FED. R. CJV. P. 6(b).
67. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3192.
68. /d. The factors enumerated in order to invoke the Rule 6(b) discretion are: "First, any
extension of a time limitation must be 'for cause shown[,]' [and] [s]econd, . . . any post-deadline
extension must be 'upon motion made.'" /d.
69. /d.
70. See supra note 2.
71. See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988).
72. Id. "Agency action" is defined to constitute the following: " '[A]gency action' includes the
whole or a part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial
thereof, or failure to act . . . . " 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (1988).
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action "within the meaning of a relevant statute." 73 This requires a
showing that the injury complained of falls within the "zone of interests" sought to be protected by FLPMA and NEPA. 74
Moreover, neither the FLPMA nor the NEPA provides for a private right of action. 711 Rather, relief from a "final agency action" is
required in order for a party to obtain redress. 76 It was therefore essential that the NWF, in the evidence submitted to the court, illustrate
that a final administrative action had had an adverse effect.
The final area of contention accompanying the contest of an administrative action is the degree of specificity with which a party must
allege and prove an injury suffered in order to prevent the courts from
summarily disposing of a case. 77 It is in this area that the Court could
have provided additional insight to solidify this genre of federal
litigation.

1.

Federal agency action which affects parties

The Court in Lujan articulated the requirement of demonstrating
"agency action" as follows: "[T]he [party] claiming a right to sue must
identify some 'agency action' that affects him in the specified fashion
78
••.."
The specified fashion under section 702 of the APA is defined
as "the whole or a part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or the denial thereof, or failure to act." 79
The Court in Lujan did assert that the land withdrawal program
was not a specified type of agency action under section 702 and therefore not a "final agency action." 80 The particular agency action was the
withdrawal under the BLM land withdrawal program of 180 million
acres of public land. There is a marked disagreement between the Supreme Court Justices whether action taken under the BLM land with73. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3185 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 702).
74. Lujan, 110 S Ct. at 3186. For a listing of the interests or purposes of the FLPMA, see
supra note 56.
75. See Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3185.
76. /d.
77. See Burford, 835 F.2d at 311-15. The D.C. Circuit stated with precision the holdings
from the seminal cases in this area-Sierra and SCRAP. However, the tendency of various courts
to vacilate in applying the principles of Sierra and SCRAP was also apparent. The primary
difficulty appeared to be in determining the degree of specificity required in alleging and submitting evidence of injury due to the agency action, with Sierra precluding general allegations of
injury suffered and SCRAP illustrating a successful case for supporting an allegation of injury in
order to have the case decided on the merits. /d.
78. See Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3185.
79. 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (1988).
80. See Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3189. The "final agency action" distinction is relevant since no
private right of action exists under § 702, only review for "final agency actions." /d.
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drawal program constitutes a "final agency action." 81 Arguably, however, the first requirement of identifying an agency action under the
BLM land withdrawal program is satisfied and would entitle the
NWF to judicial review.
The standing requirements for an individual or an organization,
although essentially the same, can be different. The purpose behind the
standing requirement is to ensure that the party before the court has a
sufficient stake in the outcome of a controversy to justify that party's
litigation of the claim. 82 The general standing requirements for both
individuals and organizations for standing are: First, the party seeking
standing must have suffered, or is likely to suffer, some type of injury
in fact; second, the harm suffered or likely to be suffered must be individual and not an injury which is general, or one which a large group
of others is also likely to suffer from; and finally, the action being challenged must be the cause in fact of the injury (i.e., the injury is not only
the actual cause of the injury but also the relief being sought must be
likely to redress the injury). 83 The "injury in fact" requirement, however, takes on added importance for a party seeking representational
standing. 84
The ability of an organization to obtain representational standing
for its members in a federal administrative agency action is well established.8G The Court in Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising
Commission 86 established this principle and delineated the method by
which an organization could obtain representational standing for its
members. Representational standing is permitted when: "(1) one or
more of the organization's members would otherwise have standing to
sue in their own right; (2) the interests the organization seeks to protect
are germane to the organization's purposes; and (3) neither the claim
asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual
81. See Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3189-90 n.2 (Scalia, J., contending that the land withdrawal
program is not a final agency action). But see Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3201-02 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that land withdrawal under the control of the BLM does in fact constitute a
"program" that would qualify as a final agency action under the APA).
82. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw § I 1-2, at 107 (2d ed. 1988).
83. See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974) (the Schlesinger case is particularly important because the Court determined that it was not willing to recognize standing for
harms suffered to citizens in general).
84. See United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412
U.S. 669 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
85. See, e.g., International Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agricultural Implement
Workers of Am. v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274 (1986); Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising
Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
86. 432 u.s. 333 (1977).
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members in the lawsuit." 87
In Lujan and the litigation preceding it, the courts have recognized that organizations are capable of obtaining representational
standing. 88 The petitioners, however, contested whether the NWF and
its members satisfied the Hunt requirements. 89 In particular, the petitioners argued against representational standing because the NWF
failed to show that "each of its members ha[d] standing." 90 The petitioners asserted that the members of the NWF would not have individual standing due to their failure to properly allege the requisite injury
in fact. 91 The assertion that each member must show injury in fact is
incorrect; the D.C. Circuit correctly pointed out that "the [NWF] need
only demonstrate that 'one or more' of its members would have standing to challenge the [BLM's] actions." 92

2. The party must prove that it has been "adversely affected or
aggrieved"
The Court in Lujan gave a concise explanation of what constitutes
evidence sufficient to demonstrate that a party has been "adversely affected or aggrieved. " 93 The Court stated that "the [party] must establish that the injury he complains of [(his aggrievement, or the adverse
effect upon him)] falls within the 'zone of interests' sought to be protected by the statutory provision whose violation forms the legal basis
for his complaint." 94 Therefore, the inquiry germane to determining
whether or not a party has been "adversely affected" by an agency ruling is "what zones of interests does the statute in question protect. " 911
The relevant statutes for determining the zones of interests in Lujan were FLPMA96 and NEPA. 97 The express language of these statutes illustrates that the respondents' contentions were within the zones
of interests. The impairment to the respondents' recreational use and
aesthetic enjoyment indicates that they had been "adversely affected" by
the agency action. 98 FLPMA contains the following "zone of interest"
87. /d. at 343.
88. See supra note 3.
89. See Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3189-91.
90. Burford, 835 F.2d at 314.
91. /d. at 311.
92. /d. at 314 (citations omitted).
93. See Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3177, 3186 (1990).
94. Id. at 3186 (citing Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 396-97 (1987)) (emphasis in original).
95. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3186.
96. 43 u.s.c. § 1701 (1988).
97. NEPA, § 102, 42 U.S.C. 4321 (1988).
98. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. FLPMA and NEPA expressly state that they
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language: "[to) provide for outdoor recreation and human occupancy
and use .
" 99
Based upon the express language of the applicable statutes, therefore, it appears clear that the respondents in Lujan were adversely affected. Nevertheless, the Court determined that the NWF did not have
adequate standing to contest the federal agency action. In so doing, the
Court decided that the respondents had failed to demonstrate the requisite specificity of injury to its members to guarantee standing. 100

3.

The degree of specificity required to allege and prove an injury

After Lujan, the degree of specificity with which a potential plaintiff must allege injury in order to establish standing in an agency action
is unclear. The D.C. Circuit in Burford outlined the development of
the "specificity requirement" prior to Lujan. 101 The degree of specificity had previously evolved under Sierra 102 and SCRAP. 103 Based upon
Sierra, the D.C. Circuit noted that "the Federation [NWF) must
demonstrate that 'the challenged action ha[d] caused [its members) injury in fact.' " 104 The application of the injury in fact rule was further
refined under SCRAP, where the D.C. Circuit stated that "[t)he Federation must allege facts demonstrating a definable and discernible injury
to its members and an adequate connection between that injury and the
members.'' 1011 The Court in Lujan never expressed its understanding of
what constitutes the desired degree of specificity.
a. Requisite injury sufficient to establish standing. The requirement that a plaintiff allege actual injury in order to establish standing
creates confusion in Lujan. This requirement dictates that the action
being challenged must be the cause in fact of the injury. 106 In addition,
the relief sought in the action must be likely to redress the injury suffered.107 It is apparent that in Lujan the respondent's alleged injury-the loss of aesthetic enjoyment and recreational use-was the result of agency action under the land withdrawal and review program.
are to protect the applicable federal land to encourage and preserve the land for aesthetic enjoyment and recreational use.
99. 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(8) (1988).
100. See Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3187-89; see also supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
101. Burford, 835 F.2d at 311-15.
102. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
103. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412
U.S. 669 (1973).
104. Burford, 835 F.2d at 311 (quoting Sierra, 405 U.S. at 733).
105. Burford, 835 F.2d at 311 (citing SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 688-89). For an enumeration of
the general standing requirements, see supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
I 06. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
107. ld.
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The difficulty in the Court's analysis, however, rests primarily with the
remedy sought and the vast implications resulting if the respondents
would have prevailed. 108
In Lujan, the vast public land potentially affected and the sensitivity of the questions at issue probably influenced the district court and
the Supreme Court to summarily dispose of the NWF's claim. The
courts disposed of the action by applying Rule 56(c), concluding that
the evidence submitted by the respondent was vague and did not meet
the Sierra and SCRAP specificity requirements. 109 To determine
whether the evidentiary requirement was met according to precedent, it
is important to recognize that the degree of specificity is different depending upon the stage of litigation. 110
b. Specificity required to establish injury. In Sierra, the Court denied representational standing for an organization where the alleged
injury was a generalized public injury. 111 SCRAP seemed to extend
standing to organizations capable of alleging specific injury to either the
organization itself or its membersP 2 However, the Court in SCRAP
qualified this broad holding by stating that
[a] plaintiff must allege that he has been or will in fact be perceptibly
harmed by the challenged agency action, not that he can imagine circumstances in which he could be affected by the agency's action. And
it is equally clear that the allegations must be true and capable of
proof at trial. 113
Also implicit in the Court's holding is the view that the degree of
specificity with which a plaintiff must allege injury may vary, depending upon the procedural posture of the case. 114 SCRAP indicates that
greater specificity in alleging an injury is required in order for a party
to overcome a motion for summary judgment. Unfortunately, in Lujan,
108. For example, the preliminary injunction granted originally by the district court in National Wildlife Federation v. Burford, 676 F. Supp. 271 (1985), had the effect of freezing the
status of approximately 180 million acres of public land.
109. See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 699 F. Supp. 327 (D.D.C. 1988); Lujan v.
National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990).
110. Burford, 835 F.2d at 312; see also Wilderness Soc'y v. Griles, 824 F.2d 4, 16 (D.C.
Cir. 1987).
111. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731-41 ( 1972); see also Schlesinger v. Reservists
Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974) (requiring that a litigant individualize the "injury
in fact" requirement).
112. See United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP),
412 U.S. 669 (1973); see also supra note 7.
113. SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 688-89.
114. See id. at 689; see also Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26,
45 (1976) (dealing with several organizations representing the poor and attacking Internal Revenue rules reducing the amount of free medical care hospitals must donate to the poor).
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the Court failed to state the precise degree of specificity a party must
provide. This lack of specific guidance regarding the degree of specificity a party must allege and prove creates ambiguity which not only
contributed to the extensive litigation in Lujan but will likely result in
similar litigation in the future.

B.

Proposed Establishment of a Uniform Standing Requirement

1.

The general requirements to establish standing

In view of the uncertainty regarding the standing requirements as
presently interpreted by the Court, this note proposes a solution. The
proposal is comprised of both established precedent relating to representational standing to contest administrative action and part of a proposal by Judge Williams of the D.C. Circuit in his concurring opinion
in Burford. 1111 The general representational standing principles from
Hunt provide the starting point. 116 The Court in Hunt stated these
principles as follows: "(a) that its members would otherwise have
standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect
are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim
asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual
members in the lawsuit." 117 The Hunt test should provide general
guidance for litigants at the initiation of the proceedings to determine in
some broad sense whether or not they will be able to establish standing.

2.

judicial limitation for representational standing

The limitation on representational standing imposed by the Sierra
and the Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War 118 decisions should also be retained. In other words, organizations should be
required to demonstrate that "the challenged action [h)as caused [its
members] injury in fact." 119 The D.C. Circuit in Burford demonstrated the type of injury which a plaintiff must allege to obtain standing by stating that "(the party asserting standing) must allege facts
demonstrating a definable and discernible injury to its members." 120
The injury, therefore, must be individualized, and the Court should
continue to deny standing where a litigant alleges general injuries suffered by the public at large.
115. Burford, 835 F.2d at 327 (Williams, J., concurring).
116. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
117. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977).
118. 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
119. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 733 (1972) (emphasis added).
120. Burford, 835 F.2d at 311 (citing United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory
Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 688-89 (1973)).
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The specificity to which allegations should adhere

The degree of specificity necessary for a party to establish standing
and avoid premature disposal of its action was best addressed by Judge
Williams of the D.C. Circuit in his concurrence in Burford. 121 Judge
Williams' opinion provided that to demonstrate the requisite specificity
for standing, a party would have to "(1) identify lands that are affected
by each program, (2) demonstrate that third parties are likely to respond to the regulatory changes with development activities, and (3)
identify activities of members in specific areas that would suffer an adverse impact from such third-party conduct." 122
Adopting Judge William's three requirements would expressly require litigants to identify not only the injury but also some type of a
causal nexus between the agency action and the specific injury suffered.
This requirement will undoubtedly be met with opposition by litigants
claiming that they are required to prove their case before a trial on the
merits. The preceding requirements should not be viewed this strictly;
the "William's requirements" should merely be understood to require
parties to form their complaints with greater caution, thus providing
greater predictability in the area of representational standing.

4.

Benefits from adopting the proposed standing approach

The Constitution generally limits the federal courts to hearing and
deciding only "cases or controversies." 123 The approach proposed in
this note will aid in sharpening the issues in order to avoid the substantial ambiguity relating to the "standing" issue. In addition, it will prevent courts from summarily dismissing cases which present politically
sensitive issues if the litigants have met the requirements of litigation.
Finally, it will present cases where standing is recognized to be proper,
thus avoiding waste of valuable judicial resources for burdensome
standing determinations.

V.

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this note is not to point out that the federal courts
entered an incorrect decision in Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation. The intent, rather, is to illustrate that the courts missed an opportunity to establish more certain parameters for representational stand121. See Burford, 835 F.2d at 327 (Williams, J., concurring).
122. /d. at 327-28 (emphasis added) (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 733
(1972); United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S.
669, 688-89 (1973); Wilderness Soc'y v. Griles, 824 F.2d 4, 10-12 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
123. See U.S. CoNST. art. III.
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ing, an area of the law which presents substantial ambiguity to
litigants. This ambiguity is the result of differing interpretations of the
Sierra and SCRAP cases and their progeny. 124 With a more definite
standard to establish standing, the courts could have heard the entire
case and decided on firmer guidelines in the politically sensitive area of
federal land withdrawal and agency review. The proposed alterations
in determining representational standing should provide guidance to
help avoid protracted litigation, centering only upon the standing issue
as evidenced by Lujan and supplying future guidance for courts and
practitioners. 1211

Darin T. judd

124. See supra notes 8-30 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 114-22 and accompanying text.

